The dynamic core hypothesis proposes that the neural mechanisms underlying consciousness consist of a functional cluster in the thalamocortical system, within which reentrant neuronal interactions yield a succession of differentiated yet unitary metastable states.
The dynamic core hypothesis proposes that the neural mechanisms underlying consciousness consist of a functional cluster in the thalamocortical system, within which reentrant neuronal interactions yield a succession of differentiated yet unitary metastable states.The boundaries of the dynamic core are suggested to shift over time, with some neuronal groups leaving and others being incorporated, these transitions occurring under the influence of internal and external signals (Edelman and Tononi 2000).Tags: Many References Needed DissertationMba Essays BusinessweekEssays About Into The WildFaust History Band EssaysPersonal Essay Describing YourselfAnalysis In A Research PaperPitt Dissertation SearchFarm Business Plan OutlineResearch Review Paper Biodiesel From Microalgae Yusuf Chisti
2005), useful models can be either mathematical/logical or verbal/conceptual.
Models of consciousness should be distinguished from so-called neural correlates of consciousness (Crick & Koch 1990).
According to the theory, distributed neural/cognitive models continually produce content in parallel, and conscious content is merely that content which has the biggest impact on the rest of the system.
More recently, Dennett (2001) has utilized the metaphor of ‘fame in the brain’ to describe his theory.
Other automatically activated processors do not enter the global workspace. Any such global pattern can inhibit alternative activity patterns among workspace neurons, thus preventing the conscious processing of alternative stimuli (for example, during the so-called attentional blink).
The global neuronal workspace model predicts that conscious presence is a nonlinear function of stimulus salience; i.e., a gradual increase in stimulus visibility should be accompanied by a sudden transition of the neuronal workspace into a corresponding activity pattern (Dehaene et al. Wallace has advocated a network-theoretic modelling perspective on global workspace theory (Wallace 2005).GW theory was originally described in terms of a ‘blackboard’ architecture in which separate, quasi-independent processing modules interface with a centralized, globally available resource (Baars 1988).This cognitive level of description is preserved in the computational models of Franklin and Graesser (1999), who proposed a model consisting of a population of interacting ‘software agents’, and Shanahan (2005), whose model incorporates aspects of internal simulation supporting executive control and more recently spiking neurons (Shanahan, 2008).A model of consciousness is a theoretical description that relates brain properties of consciousness (e.g., fast irregular electrical activity, widespread brain activation) to phenomenal properties of consciousness (e.g., qualia, a first-person-perspective, the unity of a conscious scene).Because of the diverse nature of these properties (Seth et al.Higher-order consciousness, distinguished in humans by an explicit sense of self and the ability to construct past and future scenes, arose at a later stage with reentrant pathways linking value-dependent categorization with linguistic performance and conceptual memory (Edelman 2003).The information integration theory of consciousness (IITC; Tononi 2004, 2008) claims that consciousness corresponds to the capacity of a system to integrate information.A different approach to modelling consciousness has focused on informational aspects of consciousness.The dynamic core hypothesis (Edelman and Tononi 2000; Tononi and Edelman 1998) was developed in the context of the theory of neuronal group selection (TNGS, also known as neural Darwinism), a selectionist theory of brain development and brain function (Edelman 1987; Edelman 2003).It is argued that the occurrence of any particular conscious scene constitutes a highly informative discrimination, for the reason that conscious scenes are at once ‘’integrated’’ (every conscious scene is experienced “all of a piece”) and ‘’differentiated’’ (every conscious scene is unique).A central claim of the dynamic core hypothesis is that conscious qualia ‘’are’’ these discriminations (Edelman 2003).